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Case No. 20060970-CA
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
v.
TERRILL C. JOHNSON,
Defendant/ Appellee.

Reply Brief
POINT I
A STATEMENT THAT A STREET ADDRESS IS IN UTAH,
WHEREAS IN FACT IT IS IN ARIZONA, IS A FALSE STATEMENT
Defendant claims that he did not make a false statement or knowingly
conceal a material fact. Br. Aple. at 6. However, he does not deny that the
properties he has described in various registration applications as 385 W. Arizona
Avenue, 785 W. Arizona Avenue, 385 N. Juniper Street, 385 N. Richard Street, and
380 N. Juniper Street are located in Colorado City, Arizona. See Br. Aple. 6-9. Nor
does he deny that, on those same registration applications, he represented that
these properties are located in Hilldale, Utah. Id. A statement to the effect that
property located in Arizona is located in Utah is a false statement.

Of course, at the preliminary hearing the State is not required to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant made a false statement. The quantum of evidence necessary bind a
defendant over for trial is "relatively low." State v. Clark 2001UT 9, ^ 10,20 P.3d
300 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To prevail at a preliminary
hearing, the prosecution need only produce "believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged." Id. at ^ 15 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Moreover, in applying this standard, "the magistrate must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id. at 10.
This standard was amply satisfied here. Defendant's address is in Arizona;
he stated that it was in Utah. Now it may be that" [a]n 'address' is not necessarily
the same as one's 'domicile/" or that "Hildale and Colorado City physically
comprise a single community," or that they "share one post office," or that an
investigator located the real property despite the fact that defendant gave a false
city and state. Br. of Aple. at 6-8. But "[f]acts are stubborn things," Hiller B.
Zobel, The Boston Massacre 293 (1970) (quoting John Adams's summation in Rex
v. Wemms), and 385 W. Arizona Avenue does in fact sit on the south side of the
state line. So defendant's statement was false.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH MAKING A FALSE
STATEMENT, NOT WITH CONFUSING HIS BONA FIDE
RESIDENCE WITH HIS "DOMICILE," "SITUS ADDRESS/'
"STREET ADDRESS," "MAILING ADDRESS," OR "ADDRESS
INFORMATION"
Defendant argues that he "cannot be subject to punishment for allegedly
misrepresenting his "bona fide residence' when he was never asked to declare his
residency." Br. Aple. at 13. This argument misperceives the elements of the crime
with which defendant was charged.
Defendant was charged with false evidences of title or registration under
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315(2) (West 2004):
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to:
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a
material fact in an application under this chapter;....
The application referred to is the application described in Utah Code Ann. § 41la-209(l) (West Supp. 2005) (" An owner of a vehicle subject to registration under
this part shall apply to the division for registration on forms furnished by the
division."). Thus, to bind defendant over for trial, the prosecution at minimum
bore the burden of establishing probable cause to believe that defendant (1)
knowingly (2) made a false statement (3) on an application to register a motor
vehicle in the State of Utah.
3

The prosecution established that defendant made a false statement on his
vehicle registration application. On each application, he stated that his street
address was located in Utah, whereas in fact it is located in Arizona. Academic
arguments about whether "there is a distinction between what is connoted by the
word 'address' and the phrase 'bona fide residence/" or whether "the phrase
'bona fide residence' refers to one's domicile," or whether "the phrases 'Situs
Address/ 'Street Address/ 'Mailing Address/ and 'Address Information'... ask
one to declare the state of his residency," or whether "the phrase 'Permanent
Address'" does or "does not request the declaration of one's domicile," or
whether "the phrase 'permanent address' has been held the equivalent of 'bona
fide residence' or 'domicile,'" or whether "[tjhere are a number of rights and
privileges that can only be legally exercised by bona fide residents of the state,"
or whether state registration application forms "never use the words 'reside/
'resident/ 'residency/ or 'domicile,'" Br. Aple. at 9-12, miss the point. None of
these legal distinctions has any power to move 385 W. Arizona Avenue across the
state line.
Although the concept of "bona fide residence" is not an element or subelement of the charged crime, it is tangentially related to this case. A separate
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statute specifies that the Utah vehicle application form must include the
applicant's "bona fide residence":
(2) The application for registration shall include:
(b) the name, bona fide residence and mailing address of the
owner, or business address of the owner if the owner is a firm,
association, or corporation;....
§ 41-la-209(2)(b) (West Supp. 2005). However, defendant is not charged with
violation of this statute. Indeed, it is not a criminal statute. It is a statute
specifying the information the Division of Motor Vehicles should include in its
registration application. See § 41-la-209(l) (West Supp. 2005). Whether DMV
complied with this direction and requested the statutorily required information
is immaterial here. Perhaps, as defendant suggests, DMV did not request
defendant's address with sufficient precision. But whether it did or did not, 385
W. Arizona Avenue is not located in Hilldale, Utah. Defendant thus made a false
statement on the application, which is all he is charged with having done.
Defendant's statements were not false because he gave his "bona fide
residence" instead of his "domicile," or his "domicile" instead of his "Permanent
Address," or his "Permanent Address" instead of his "bona fide residence." They
are false because he gave an address that does not exist.
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POINT III
AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE LAW REQUIRES THE
PROSECUTION TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE OF THE ELEMENTS OF
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOT EVIDENCE OF WHAT THE
MAGISTRATE BELIEVES TO BE THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY
UNDERLYING THE CRIMINAL STATUTE
Defendant argues that "the State has failed to produce any evidence from
which fraudulent intent could be established either directly or by inference/7 Br.
Aple. at 13. This argument fails for two reasons: because what it assumes is false,
and because what it asserts is false.
The argument assumes that the State had an obligation to produce evidence
of fraudulent intent. It did not. "[T]o prevail at a preliminary hearing, the
prosecution must... produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime
charged/' Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 15 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). "Fraudulent intent" is not an element of the crime charged.
Defendant was charged with eight counts of violating subsection (2) of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-1315. R. 1-3. Some variants of the crime of false evidences of
title or registration—those found in subsections (1), (3), and (4)—do require a
showing of fraud; other variants — those found in subsections (2), (5), (6), (7), and
(8)-do not:
It is a second degree felony for a person with respect to a motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer to:
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(1) fraudulently use a false or fictitious name in an application for
registration, a certificate of title, or for a duplicate certificate of title;
(2) knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a materialfact
in an application under this chapter;
(3) otherwise commit a fraud in an application under this chapter;
(4) alter with fraudulent intent a certificate of title, registration card,
license plate, or permit issued by the division;
(5) forge or counterfeit a document or license plate purporting to
have been issued by the division;
(6) alter, falsify, or forge an assignment upon a certificate of title;
(7) hold or use a document or license plate under this chapter
knowing it has been altered, forged, or falsified; and
(8) file an application for a certificate of title providing false lien
information, when the person named on the application as lienholder
does not hold a valid security interest.
§ 41-la-1315 (West 2004) (charged provisions emphasized).

Subsection (2)

requires only a knowingly made false statement. Id. The prosecution adduced
evidence establishing probable cause that defendant knowingly made a false
statement.
Unable to defend the literal truth of his statements on the registration
applications, defendant extrapolates from the statute a policy and argues that he
did not violate that policy.

See Br. Aple. at 17. He contends that "[t]he

proposition that it is the duty of the judiciary to construe and enforce criminal
statutes without regard to the underlying policies is absurd/' Br. Aple. at 17.
Policy may indeed play a role in statutory interpretation, but defendant's
approach places the cart before the horse. "The plain language controls the
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interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity [does the court] look
beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos
v. Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2,1f 13, 993 P.2d 207. The plain language
of the registration statute is unambiguous: "It is a second degree felony for a
person with respect to a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to . . . knowingly
make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact in an application
under this chapter . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315(2) (West 2004). To state
that property located in Arizona is located in Utah is to make a false statement.
This ends the inquiry. No foray into legislative history or policy considerations
is necessary or appropriate.
Defendant also contends that "[i]n the district court the State seemed to
concede that Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1315(2) requires proof that the defendant
act with fraudulent intent/7 Br. Aple. at 13 (citing R. 90:7-8). On the contrary, the
prosecutor merely argued that "in this case, the state has proven that there is a
bad motive/7 R. 90: 7. The fact that the State proved bad motive does not
constitute a concession that "bad motive" must be grafted onto the statutory
elements of the crime.

It may indicate only that the prosecutor was

concerned—justifiably, as it turned out—that the magistrate might do so. After
all, defendant had argued in an earlier hearing that the prosecution had failed to
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establish that defendant acted with fraudulent intent, as if that were an element
of the crime. R. 89: 63.
Not only does defendant's argument wrongly assume that fraudulent intent
is an element of the charged crime, it also wrongly asserts that the State "failed
to produce any evidence from which fraudulent intent could be established either
directly or by inference/' Br. Aple. at 13. The evidence strongly supported the
inference that defendant acted with fraudulent intent or with a bad motive. The
magistrate himself saw in the evidence "an indication that it's much cheaper for
Mr. Johnson to show that these are in Utah." R. 89: 61. The difference, he found,
"is usually about $200 per vehicle." Id. A magistrate "must view all evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) Here, the inference that defendant made false
statements on the applications for the purpose of defrauding his home state out
of registration fees is not only a reasonable inference, but the only reasonable
inference. Not even defendant has suggested any good motive for his false
statement that may be inferred from this evidence. Thus, even if fraudulent intent
were an element of the crime, defendant should have been bound over.
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Finally, defendant argues that "[a]n individual may be deemed a 'resident7
for the purposes of the registration requirements of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act
if he maintains a place of business in this state that bases and operates a motor
vehicle here/' Br. Aple. at 17-18 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-202(l)(b)(i)(B)(I))
(West Supp. 2007). This is true. Indeed, the Act authorizes a broad array of
alternatives to an applicant who wishes to qualify as a "resident" for purposes of
vehicle registration. See § 41-la-202(l)(b)(i)(A) (WestSupp. 2007). Conspicuously
absent from the list of alternatives, however, is the alternative defendant in fact
chose: making a false statement on the vehicle registration application. That
defendant might have achieved his apparent objective lawfully does not justify
his crime.
The magistrate's analysis here appears to have been colored by a policy
disagreement with the Legislature. He acknowledged the only statutory purpose
discernible from the face of the statute: "Utah has an interest in the sanctity and
truthfulness of its records." R. 89: 65. But he added, "Whether or not it is so
much to bring it to a second degree felony level is perhaps another issue." Id.
It is indeed another issue, and one for the Legislature alone. As noted in the
State's opening brief, courts "'have nothing to do with what the law ought to be.
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[They] must be guided by the law as it is.'" State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992,994 (Utah
App. 1993) (quoting Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127,135,202 P. 377,380 (1921)).
The question at this stage is whether the evidence was sufficient to bind
defendant over on the charged offenses. In making this determination, the
magistrate's "discretion is limited,,, State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,134,137 P.3d 787,
and his concerns with the strictness of the statute are irrelevant. Those concerns
may become relevant at a later stage in the proceedings, when the court enjoys
more discretion. For example, if at the time of sentencing, the court, in light of all
the circumstances, "concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction
as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence
accordingly/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (West Supp. 2007). With the consent
of the prosecutor, the level of offense may even be reduced two degrees. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(3)(a) (West Supp. 2007). In addition, the sentencing court
may suspend execution of any sentence imposed and place defendant on
probation. However, the concerns that might inform a decision at that stage have
no role at this stage.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution adduced some believable
evidence of all the statutory elements of the charged crime. Nothing more is
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required for bindover. The dismissal should therefore be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
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